This study investigates whether market-wide liquidity is a state variable important for asset pricing. We¯nd that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of returns to°uctuations in aggregate liquidity. Our monthly liquidity measure, an average of individual-stock measures estimated with daily data, relies on the principle that order°ow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is lower. Over a 34-year period, the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5% annually, adjusted for exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors.
I. Introduction
In standard asset pricing theory, expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to returns' sensitivities to state variables with pervasive e®ects on investors' overall welfare. A security whose lowest returns tend to accompany unfavorable shifts in that welfare must o®er additional compensation to investors for holding the security. Liquidity appears to be a good candidate for a priced state variable. It is often viewed as an important feature of the investment environment and macroeconomy, and recent studies¯nd that°uctuations in various measures of liquidity are correlated across assets.
1 This empirical study investigates whether market-wide liquidity is indeed priced. That is, we ask whether cross-sectional differences in expected stock returns are related to the sensitivities of returns to°uctuations in aggregate liquidity.
It seems reasonable that many investors might require higher expected returns on assets whose returns have higher sensitivities to aggregate liquidity. Consider, for example, any investor who employs some form of leverage and faces a margin or solvency constraint, in that if his overall wealth drops su±ciently he must liquidate some assets to raise cash. If he holds assets with higher sensitivities to liquidity, then such liquidations are more likely to occur when liquidity is low, since drops in his overall wealth are then more likely to accompany drops in liquidity. Liquidation is costlier when liquidity is lower, and those greater costs are especially unwelcome to an investor whose wealth has already dropped and who thus has higher marginal utility of wealth. Unless the investor expects higher returns from holding these assets, he would prefer assets less likely to require liquidation when liquidity is low, even if the latter assets are just as likely to require liquidation on average.
2
The well-known 1998 episode involving Long-Term Capital Managment (LTCM) seems 1 Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) , Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) , Huberman and Halka (1999) , and Lo and Wang (2000) empirically analyze the systematic nature of stock-market liquidity. Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2002) ¯nd that improvements in stock-market liquidity are associated with monetary expansions and that°uctuations in liquidity are correlated across stocks and bond markets. Eisfeldt (2002) develops a model in which endogenous°uctuations in liquidity are correlated with real fundamentals such as productivity and investment.
2 This economic story has yet to be formally modeled, but recent literature presents related models that lead to the same basic result. Lustig (2001) develops a model in which solvency constraints give rise to a liquidity-risk factor, in addition to aggregate consumption risk, and equity's sensitivity to the liquidity factor raises its equilibrium expected return. HolmstrÄ om and Tirole (2001) also develop a model in which a security's expected return is related to its covariance with aggregate liquidity. Unlike more standard models, their model assumes risk-neutral consumers and is driven by liquidity demands at the corporate level. Acharya and Pedersen (2002) develop a model in which each asset's return is net of a stochastic liquidity cost, and expected returns are related to return covariances with the aggregate liquidity cost (as well as to three other covariances).
an acute example of the above liquidation scenario. The hedge fund was highly levered and by design had positive sensitivity to market-wide liquidity, in that many of the fund's spread positions, established across a variety of countries and markets, went long less liquid instruments and short more liquid instruments. When the Russian debt crisis precipitated a widespread deterioration in liquidity, LTCM's liquidity-sensitive portfolio dropped sharply in value, triggering a need to liquidate in order to meet margin calls. The anticipation of costly liquidation in a low-liquidity environment then further eroded LTCM's position. (The liquidation was eventually overseen by a consortium of 14 institutions organized by the New York Federal Reserve.) Even though exposure to liquidity risk ultimately spelled LTCM's doom, the fund performed quite well in the previous four years, and presumably its managers perceived high expected returns on its liquidity-sensitive positions.
3
Liquidity is a broad and elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price. We focus on an aspect of liquidity associated with temporary price°uctuations induced by order°ow. Our monthly aggregate liquidity measure is a cross-sectional average of individual-stock liquidity measures. Each stock's liquidity in a given month, estimated using that stock's within-month daily returns and volume, represents the average e®ect that a given volume on day d has on the return for day d + 1, when the volume is given the same sign as the return on day d. The basic idea is that, if signed volume is viewed roughly as \order°ow," then lower liquidity is re°ected in a greater tendency for order°ow in a given direction on day d to be followed by a price change in the opposite direction on day d + 1. Essentially, lower liquidity corresponds to stronger volume-related return reversals, and in this respect our liquidity measure follows the same line of reasoning as the model and empirical evidence presented by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) . They¯nd that returns accompanied by high volume tend to be reversed more strongly, and they explain how this result is consistent with a model in which some investors are compensated for accommodating the liquidity demands of others.
We¯nd that stocks' \liquidity betas," their sensitivities to innovations in aggregate liquidity, play a signi¯cant role in asset pricing. Stocks with higher liquidity betas exhibit higher expected returns. In particular, between January 1966 and December 1999, a spread between the top and bottom deciles of predicted liquidity betas produces an abnormal return (\alpha") of 7.5% per year with respect to a model that accounts for sensitivities to four other factors: the market, size, and value factors of Fama and French (1993) and a momentum factor. The alpha with respect to just the three Fama-French factors is over 9% per year. The results are both statistically and economically signi¯cant, and similar results occur in both halves of the overall 34-year period.
This study investigates whether expected returns are related to systematic liquidity risk in returns, as opposed to the level of liquidity per se. The latter's relation to expected stock returns has been investigated by numerous empirical studies, including Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) , Datar, Naik, and Radcli®e (1998), and Fiori (2000) . 4 Using a variety of liquidity measures, these studies generally¯nd that less liquid stocks have higher average returns. Amihud (2002) and Jones (2002) document the presence of a time-series relation between their measures of market liquidity and expected market returns. Instead of investigating the level of liquidity as a characteristic that is relevant for pricing, this study entertains market-wide liquidity as a state variable that a®ects expected stock returns because its innovations have e®ects that are pervasive across common stocks. The potential usefulness of such a perspective is recognized by Subrahmanyam (2000, 2001 ).
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001)¯nd a signi¯cant cross-sectional relation between stock returns and the variability of liquidity, where liquidity is proxied by measures of trading activity such as volume and turnover. The authors report that stocks with more volatile liquidity have lower expected returns, an unexpected result. Liquidity risk in that study is measured as¯rm-speci¯c variability in liquidity. Our paper focuses on systematic liquidity risk in returns and¯nds that stocks whose returns are more exposed to market-wide liquidity°uctuations command higher expected returns.
Section II explains the construction of the liquidity measure and brie°y describes some of its empirical features. The sharpest troughs in market-wide liquidity occur in months easily identi¯ed with signi¯cant¯nancial and economic events, such as the 1987 crash, the beginning of the 1973 oil embargo, the 1997 Asian¯nancial crisis, and the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Moreover, in months of large liquidity drops, stock returns are negatively correlated with¯xed-income returns, in contrast to other months. This observation seems consistent with \°ight-to-quality" e®ects. We also¯nd signi¯cant commonality across stocks in our monthly liquidity measure. That result, in accord with the high-frequency evidence of previous studies, enhances the prospect that market-wide liquidity could be a priced state variable.
Section III presents the asset pricing investigation. We¯nd that stocks' liquidity betas can be predicted not only by their simple historical estimates but by other variables as well. Each year, we sort stocks by their predicted liquidity betas and form ten portfolios. This procedure yields a substantial spread in the estimated post-formation liquidity betas as well as the large spread in abnormal returns reported above. Sorting stocks on their historical liquidity betas alone produces results that are slightly less strong but still signi¯cant. A sort on¯rm size reveals that stocks of the smallest¯rms tend to have high liquidity betas as well as signi¯cantly positive alphas with respect to the four-factor model.
Section IV provides an investment perspective on liquidity risk by examining the degree to which spreads between stocks with high and low liquidity risk expand the mean-variance opportunity set. In an investment universe that also includes the market portfolio and spreads based on size, value, and momentum, we¯nd that liquidity-risk spreads receive substantial weight in the portfolio with the highest ex post Sharpe ratio. The importance of the momentum spread in that portfolio is especially reduced as compared to a universe without a liquidity-risk spread. Moreover, an equally weighted liquidity-risk spread reduces momentum's alpha by half in the overall 34-year period and eliminates it completely (driving it to a small negative value) in the more recent 17-year subperiod from 1983{99. Section V brie°y reviews our conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
II. Market-Wide Liquidity

A. Constructing a Measure
Liquidity has many dimensions. This study focuses on a dimension associated with temporary price changes accompanying order°ow. We construct a measure of market liquidity in a given month as the equally weighted average of the liquidity measures of individual stocks on the NYSE and AMEX, using daily data within the month.
5 Speci¯cally, the liquidity 5 All of the individual-stock return and volume data used in the study are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Daily returns and volume are from the CRSP daily stock¯le; all month-end (or year-end) codes and values are from the CRSP monthly stock le. We exclude NASDAQ in constructing the aggregate liquidity measure, because NASDAQ returns and volume data are available from CRSP for only part of this period (beginning in 1982) . Also, reported volumes on NASDAQ include inter-dealer trades, unlike the volumes reported on the NYSE and the AMEX. To exclude NASDAQ, we omit stocks with exchange codes of 3 or 33 as of the end of the previous year. We use only stocks classi¯ed as ordinary common shares (CRSP share codes 10 and 11), excluding ADRs, SBIs, certi¯cates, units, REITs, closed-end funds, companies incorporated outside the U.S., and Americus Trust Components.
measure for stock i in month t is the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimate of°i ;t in the regression r e i;d+1;t = µ i;t + Á i;t r i;d;t +°i ;t sign(r 
where quantities are de¯ned as follows: A stock's liquidity is computed in a given month only if there are more than 15 observations with which to estimate the above regression (D > 15), and we exclude a stock for the¯rst and last partial month that it appears on the CRSP tape. The daily observations are not required to be consecutive (except that each observation requires data for two successive days). Stocks with share prices less than $5 and greater than $1000 at the end of the previous month are excluded, and volume is measured in millions of dollars.
The basic idea is that \order°ow," constructed here simply as volume signed by the contemporaneous return on the stock in excess of the market, should be accompanied by a return that one expects to be partially reversed in the future if the stock is not perfectly liquid. We assume that the greater is that expected reversal for a given dollar volume, the lower is the stock's liquidity. That is, one would expect°i ;t to be negative in general and larger in absolute magnitude when liquidity is lower.
6 Viewing volume-related return reversals as arising from liquidity e®ects is motivated by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) . Those authors present a model in which risk-averse \market makers," de¯ned in the general sense of Grossman and Miller (1988) , accommodate order°ow from liquiditymotivated traders and are compensated with higher expected return (by buying at a low price or selling at a high one). The greater the order°ow, the greater the compensation, so this liquidity-induced e®ect on expected future return is larger when current volume is high. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang present empirical evidence consistent with this argument.
As illustrated below, the estimates of the liquidity measure°i ;t are typically negative, although there are months in which the average estimate is positive. The preponderance of negative values is consistent with the basic intuition underlying our liquidity measure, but 6 An alternative class of liquidity measures is based on a positive contemporaneous relation between returns and order°ow. Typically, these measures are estimated with intraday transactions data, and the volume for a transaction is signed by comparing the transaction price to the bid-ask midpoint. See, for example, Hasbrouck (1991) , Foster and Viswanathan (1993) , and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) . it must be recognized that the measure abstracts from other potential roles that volume can play in the relation between current and lagged return. For example, Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2001) explain that asymmetric information (not considered by Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993) can weaken the volume-related reversal e®ect and even produce volume-related continuations in returns on stocks for which information-motivated trading is su±ciently important. Using daily data, the authors report empirical evidence consistent with that prediction. Other related evidence is reported by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) , who conclude that momentum e®ects in monthly returns are stronger for stocks with high recent volume.
The speci¯cation of the regression in (1) is somewhat arbitrary, as is any liquidity measure. We use r e i;d;t , the return in excess of the market, both as the dependent variable as well as to sign volume, in order to remove market-wide shocks and better isolate the individual-stock e®ect of volume-related return reversals. Moreover, daily returns of zero are not uncommon with lower-priced stocks for which a one-tick move represents a greater relative price change. Signing volume based on total return is problematic in those zero-return cases, whereas returns in excess of the market are unlikely to be zero. On a day when a stock's price does not change but the market goes up, it seems reasonable to identify the stock's order°ow on that day as more likely initiated by sellers than buyers. We also include the lagged stock return as a second independent variable with the intention of capturing lagged-return e®ects that are not volume-related, such as reversals due to a minimum tick size. Since we use r e i;d;t to sign volume, we use the total return r i;d;t as this second variable to have it be less correlated with the variable whose coe±cient we take as the liquidity measure. (A higher correlation between the independent variables generally reduces the precision with which one can measure the individual slope on either one.) The precise speci¯cation of the variables in (1), as compared to seemingly close alternative speci¯cations, is addressed below in subsection C.
In order to investigate the ability of the regression slope°i ;t in (1) to capture a liquidity e®ect, we examine a simple model in which the return on a given day has an order-°ow component that is partially reversed on the subsequent day. Speci¯cally, the return on stock i on day d is given by
The¯rst two terms on the right-hand side represent permanent changes in the price, where f d is a market-wide factor and u i;d is a stock-speci¯c e®ect. The term Á i (q i;d¡1 ¡ q i;d ) is intended to capture the liquidity-related e®ect arising from order°ow q i;d , in the sense that both current and lagged order°ow enter the return, but in the opposite directions. The coe±cient Á i is negative and represents the stock's liquidity. We assume that q i;d = q
is independent across stocks and q d is a market-wide component whose standard deviation is one-third as large as that of q ¤ i;d , so the market-wide component then explains 10% of the total variance of order°ow. (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001 , report that the¯rst principal component explains 7.8% of total order-°ow variance.)
We use (2) to simulate returns on 10,000 stocks. The quantities f d , u i;d , q , and the realizations are independent across days and stocks. The value of s i for a given stock is drawn as 0:01(U [0; 1] ¡Á i ), where U [0;1] is a uniform [0; 1] variate, so the mean value of s i across stocks is 0.01, and there is some association between the typical magnitude of´i ;d and the stock's liquidity (less liquid stocks tend to have larger s i 's). In this simulation setting, the average standard deviation of a daily stock return is 0.023, the average standard deviation of each of the¯rst three right-hand side terms in (2) is 0.013, and the average standard deviation of´i ;d ¡´i ;d¡1 is 0.010. The regression in (1) requires returns in excess of the market, so we also construct a market return as r m;d = 1 n P n i=1 r i;d , for n = 10; 000. (The average R-squared in a regression of r i;d on r m;d is 0.33.) We also specify a stock's \volume" on day d as v i;d = jq i;d j.
7 For each stock, we then compute the population value of the coe±cient°i in (1) by estimating that regression across 50,000 simulated daily values. We¯nd that the cross-sectional correlation between Á i and°i is 0.98, which suggests that the regression in (1) is a reasonable speci¯cation for estimating the hypothesized liquidity e®ect.
The use of signed volume as a predictor of future return can also be motivated using the equilibrium model of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) . In their model, the stock's excess return Q t and order°ow ¢ t are jointly normal, along with Q t+1 , and the regression relating expected future return to current return and volume V t (= j¢ t j) is given by a relation 7 Due to the common factor in order°ow, the market return is correlated with lagged order°ow. Moreover, if we compute a lagged aggregate \volume" measure as V d = P i jq i;d j, then the correlation between r m;d and r m;d¡1 V d is -0.03. This feature of our simulation is consistent with the negative relation between the market return and the lagged product of return and volume reported by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) .
where Á 2 < 0 and Á 3 < 0. As the correlation between Q t and ¢ t increases, (3) becomes well approximated by
which is roughly analogous to (1). 8 To the extent that order°ow plays an important role in determining high-frequency return variation, a conjecture that seems plausible, we see that the model of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang gives some justi¯cation for the use of signed volume. Of course, their model of a single-stock economy with continuous price variables (no minimum tick) is only suggestive when applied to our empirical setting, but the intuition underlying their model corresponds to our interpretation of°i ;t as a liquidity measure.
Although the OLS slope coe±cient°i ;t is an imprecise estimate of a given stock's°i ;t , the market-wide average liquidity in month t is estimated more precisely. The disturbances in (1) are less than perfectly correlated across stocks (recall that the dependent variable is the return in excess of the market). Thus, as the number of stocks, N , grows large, the true unobserved average°t = (1=N ) P N i=1°i ;t becomes more precisely estimated bŷ°t
We construct the above market-wide measure for each month from August 1962 through December 1999. The number of stocks in the index (N) ranges from 951 to 2,188.
Given the regression speci¯cation in (1), the value of°i ;t can be viewed as the liquidity \cost," in terms of return reversal, of \trading" $1 million of stock i, so the average in (5) can be viewed as the cost of a $1 million trade distributed equally across stocks. Obviously, a dollar trade size of $1 million was more substantial in relative terms in the 1960's than in the 1990's, so not surprisingly the raw values of°t tend to be smaller in magnitude later in the period. It seems reasonable to construct a liquidity measure that re°ects the cost of a trade whose size is commensurate with the overall size of the stock market, so we construct 8 Equation (3) relies on a result given in Wang (1994) . It is straightforward to show that Wang's equation B.6 allows (3) to be restated as
where ½ is the correlation between Q t and ¢ t , and ¾ Q and ¾ ¢ are the standard deviations of those variables.
Note that as ½ ! 1, tanh h³
converges in distribution to sign(Q t ), since V t¸0 and tanh(x) approaches 1(¡1) as x ! 1(¡1).
the scaled series (m t =m 1 )°t, where m t is the total dollar value at the end of month t ¡ 1 of the stocks included in the average in month t, and month 1 corresponds to August 1962. This scaled series is plotted in Figure 1 . It can essentially be viewed as an estimate of the liquidity cost, averaged across stocks at a given point in time, of trading $1 million in 1962 \stock-market" dollars (about $34 million at the end of 1999). The average value of this liquidity measure over time is -0.03 (the median is -0.02), indicating about a 2-3% cost for such a trade. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) report that the average daily dollar volume per stock over the 1988{98 period is about $7 million. For the same period, the average value of $1 million in 1962 stock-market dollars is $14 million. Based on this comparison, one can also view our measure as the cost, for the average stock, of trading twice the daily volume.
In the next section we explore the importance of liquidity risk, measured as comovement between returns and unanticipated innovations in liquidity. The liquidity series plotted in Figure 1 has a¯rst-order serial correlation of 0.22. In constructing innovations, we do not work directly with that series, since to do so could introduce a return component through°u ctuations in the scaling factor, (m t =m 1 ). Although any such return e®ects would be lagged, since m t uses values at the end of month t ¡ 1, we nevertheless wish to minimize the possibility that any estimated relation between returns and liquidity innovations could arise in that fashion. At the same time, the innovation series should also appropriately re°ect the growth in size of the stock market. Therefore, rather than di®erence the scaled series, wē rst di®erence and then scale. Speci¯cally, to construct innovations in liquidity, we¯rst scale the monthly di®erence in liquidity measures, averaged across the N t stocks with available data in both the current and previous month,
We then regress ¢°t on its lag as well as the lagged value of the scaled level series:
This regression allows the predicted change to depend on the most recent change as well as on the deviation of the most recent level from its long-run mean (impounded in a). Aside from the scaling issues, the regression is analogous to a second-order autoregression in the level series, and it produces residuals that appear serially uncorrelated. 9 The innovation in liquidity, L t , is taken as the¯tted residual divided by 100:
9 Note that the equation (y t ¡ y t¡1 ) = a + b(y t¡1 ¡ y t¡2 ) + cy t¡1 + u t is equivalent to y t = a + b 0 y t¡1 + c 0 y t¡2 + u t , with b 0 = 1 + b + c and c 0 = ¡b.
The arbitrary scaling by 100 simply produces more convenient magnitudes of the liquidity betas reported in the next section. If expected changes in liquidity are correlated with timevariation in expected stock returns, then failure to use liquidity innovations can contaminate risk measures. We¯nd that expected liquidity changes can indeed predict future stock returns one month ahead, thereby con¯rming the desirability of forming innovations.
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B. Empirical Features of the Liquidity Measure
Perhaps the most salient features of the liquidity series plotted in Figure 1 are its occasional downward spikes, indicating months with especially low estimated liquidity. Many of these spikes occur during market downturns, consistent with the evidence in Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Jones (2002) , who use di®erent liquidity measures. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam observe that their liquidity measures plummet in down markets, and Jones¯nds that his average-spread measure exhibits frequent sharp spikes that often coincide with market downturns.
The largest downward spike in our measure of aggregate liquidity occurs in October 1987, the month of the stock-market crash. Grossman and Miller (1988) argue that both spot and futures stock markets were \highly illiquid" on October 19, the day of the crash, and Amihud, Mendelson, and Wood (1990) contend that the crash occured in part because of a rise in market illiquidity during and before October 19. The second largest spike is in November 1973, the¯rst full month of the mideast oil embargo. Estimated liquidity is generally low in the early 1970s, again consistent with the evidence in Jones (2002) . The third largest negative value is in September 1998, when liquidity is widely perceived to have dried up due to the LTCM collapse and the recent Russian debt crisis.
11 The next largest spike occurs in May 1970, a month of signi¯cant domestic political unrest. 12 The third biggest spike in the second half of the sample is observed in October 1997 at the height of the Asian¯nancial crisis. There is obviously a risk in pushing such anecdotal analysis very far, but a drop in 10 Regressions of the value-weighted and equally weighted liquidity-risk spreads LIQ V and LIQ E (de¯ned in section III) on the lagged¯tted values in (7) produce t-statistics of -3.33 and -2.30. The correlation between the innovations and the level series in Figure 1 is 0.88. We repeated the historical-beta analysis reported in Table 8 using the level series in place of the innovations, and obtained weaker results that go in the same direction as those reported.
11 The Economist magazine (September 25, 1999) writes that \In August 1998, after the Russian government had defaulted on its debts, liquidity suddenly evaporated from many¯nancial markets, causing asset prices to plunge." The article also asserts that \The possibility that liquidity might disappear from a market ... is a big source of risk to an investor."
12 On April 30, President Nixon announced the invasion of Cambodia and the need to draft 150,000 more soldiers, the Kent State and Jackson State shootings occurred on May 4 and May 14, and nearly 500 colleges and universities closed that month due to anti-war protests.
stock-market liquidity during these months seems at least plausible.
The monthly innovation in liquidity, L t , has a correlation of 0.36 with the returns on both the value-weighted and equally weighted NYSE-AMEX indexes, constructed by CRSP. This result goes in the same direction as that reported by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) , who¯nd a positive association at a daily frequency between stock returns and changes in other market-wide liquidity measures. As mentioned earlier, the downward spikes in our liquidity series often coincide with market downturns, and this observation is con¯rmed by comparing correlations between L t and the value-weighted market return for months in which that return is negative versus positive. The correlation is 0.52 in negative-return months but only 0.03 in positive-return months, and the di®erence between the liquidity-return relation in these two subsamples is statistically signi¯cant.
13 The simple correlation between L t and stock-market returns is larger than those between L t and other factors typically included in empirical asset pricing studies. In particular, L t 's correlations with SMB and HML, the size and value factors constructed by Fama and French (1993) , are 0.23 and -0.12.
14 Recall that SMB is the di®erence in returns between small and large¯rms, while HML is the return di®erence between stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios (i.e., value minus growth). The correlation between L t and a momentum factor is only 0.01. The inclusion of momentum as an asset pricing factor, here and in other studies, is motivated by the evidence in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that ranking stocks by performance over the past year produces abnormal returns.
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Our measure of aggregate liquidity also tends to be low when market volatility is high. Speci¯cally, the within-month daily standard deviation of the value-weighted market return has a correlation of -0.57 with the liquidity series in Figure 1 . This association between volatility and our liquidity measure seems reasonable, in that the compensation required by providers of liquidity for a given level of order°ow could well be greater when volatility is higher.
To describe further the nature of months with exceptionally low liquidity, we note that a kind of \°ight to quality" e®ect appears in such months. That is, months in which liquidity drops severely tend to be months in which stocks and¯xed-income assets move in opposite directions. Table 1 reports correlations between the monthly return on the CRSP valueweighted NYSE-AMEX index (R S;t ) and three¯xed-income variables: minus the change in the rate on one-month Treasury bills (¡¢R f;t ), the return on long-term government bonds (R GB;t ), and the return on long-term corporate bonds (R CB;t ).
16 The¯rst row reports the correlations across all months, and the next two rows report correlations in subsamples split according to the values of L t . The second row of Table 1 shows the correlation between R S;t and the other variables during the 14 months in which L t is at least 2 standard deviations below its mean. The correlations between stock returns and the three¯xed-income series during those months are negative, in contrast to the correlations during the remaining months, and the bootstrap p-values indicate that those di®erences are signi¯cant at levels of either 5% (for the bond returns) or 10% (for the T-bill rate change). 17 The results across both subperiods generally support the inference drawn for the overall period, in that¯ve of the six correlations between R S;t and the¯xed-income series are negative in the months of large liquidity drops.
Also shown in Table 1 is the correlation between the stock return R S;t and the change in volume Vol t , de¯ned as the equally weighted average percentage change in monthly dollar volume for NYSE-AMEX stocks. Stock returns are positively correlated with volume changes in all months, but the correlation is negative in months with large liquidity drops, and the bootstrap p-value for the overall period is 0.002. The subperiod results again support the inference that the correlation is lower in the months of severe liquidity drops. There is no obvious story here, other than perhaps that, in such months, higher volume accompanying a larger liquidity drop is another manifestation of a°ight to quality. We also¯nd that, in low liquidity months, the correlation between volume changes and L t is equal to -0.27, whereas it equals 0.18 in other months (and in all months). But, again, we do not wish to push the descriptive analysis of the market-wide liquidity series too far. The primary goal of the paper is to investigate whether liquidity is a source of priced systematic risk in stock returns, and we use the series constructed here for that purpose.
An important motive for entertaining a market-wide liquidity measure as a priced state variable is evidence that°uctuations in liquidity exhibit commonality across stocks. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Huberman and Halka (1999) ¯nd signi¯cant common-ality in various liquidity measures at a daily frequency, while Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) nd only weak commonality in intraday (15-minute)°uctuations in liquidity. Our stockby-stock measure°i t a®ords an additional perspective on commonality, since it measures liquidity di®erently, it is constructed at a monthly frequency, and our sample period is substantially longer. We conduct a simple exploration of commonality in°i t across stocks bȳ rst sorting all stocks at the end of each year by market value and then assigning them to decile portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints (i.e., each decile has an equal number of NYSE stocks). Each decile portfolio's change in liquidity for a given month is then computed as the cross-sectional average change in the individual-stock measures, and this procedure yields a 1963{1999 monthly series of liquidity changes for each decile. The sample correlation of these series between any two deciles is positive. If the decile series are averaged separately across the odd-numbered and even-numbered deciles, the sample correlation between the two resulting series is 0.56, and the t-statistic for a test of zero correlation is 14.20. This commonality in our liquidity measure across stocks enhances the prospect that market-wide liquidity represents a priced source of risk.
C. Speci¯cation issues
Our liquidity measure relies on a large cross-section of stocks and yields a monthly series spanning more than 37 years. As such, the series seems well suited for this study's focus on liquidity risk and asset pricing. Aggregate stock-market liquidity is measured in a variety of alternative ways by recent studies that explore other interesting issues. Those studies include Amihud (2002) , Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000 , 2001 , Jones (2002) , and Lo and Wang (2000) . Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam form daily time series of various measures of liquidity (such as depth and bid-ask spread) and trading activity (such as dollar volume), averaged across NYSE stocks over the period 1988 through 1998. Jones collects an annual time series of average quoted bid-ask spreads on the stocks in the Dow Jones index, covering the period of 1898 through 1998. Amihud constructs an annual aggregate liquidity series for the period of 1963 through 1997 by averaging across NYSE stocks the ratios of average absolute price change to trading volume. Lo and Wang form a weekly series of average turnover across NYSE and AMEX stocks from July 1962 to December 1996.
While measures of trading activity such as volume and turnover seem useful in explaining cross-sectional di®erences in liquidity, they do not appear to capture time variation in liquidity. Although liquid markets are typically associated with high levels of trading activity, it is often the case that volume is high when liquidity is low. One example is October 19, 1987, when the market was highly illiquid in many respects but trading volume on the NYSE set its historical record. More generally, the previous subsection shows that the positive time-series correlation between our liquidity measure and dollar volume turns negative when calculated only across low-liquidity months. For this reason, we do not proxy for time variation in liquidity using measures of trading activity. Bid-ask spreads and depth are not used either because suitable data are not available for a long enough sample period. The data of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam span 11 years, which is too short for an asset pricing study. Notably, their liquidity measures (quoted share and dollar depth, quoted absolute and proportional spreads, and e®ective absolute and proportional spreads) covary with ours in the expected direction (depth positively and spreads negatively). These measures are also jointly signi¯cant in explaining the time variation in our measure, as one might expect from measures that capture di®erent dimensions of market liquidity.
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As explained earlier, our liquidity measure re°ects reversals in returns in excess of the market. Another potential source of negative serial correlation in excess returns is nonsynchronous trading. (When returns are measured with reported closing prices, an infrequently traded security is more likely to outperform the market on a day following one on which it underperforms.) With nonsynchronous trading, however, a reversal on day d + 1 is more likely when volume on day d is low, as opposed to high as under the liquidity interpretation of°i ;t in (1). Moreover, nonsynchronous trading is likely to be more important when trading activity is low, but we¯nd that average turnover is in fact slightly higher in the months identi¯ed as having the lowest liquidity by our measure. Nevertheless, it remains possible that nonsynchronous trading makes some contribution to a negative value of°i ;t . If the negative serial correlation in excess returns, arising from either liquidity-related reversals or nonsynchronous trading, is relatively more stable through time than volatility, then°uctuations in volatility are likely to be re°ected in the value of°i ;t . Recall from the earlier discussion that our aggregate liquidity series exhibits a negative association with market volatility.
The liquidity measure used in this paper has substantial ex ante appeal and a number of empirical liquidity-like features, as argued earlier. One class of alternative measures involves merely changing the precise speci¯cation of regression (1). In fact, one can consider 24 di®erent speci¯cations (including ours). The variable on the left-hand side of (1) can be either the excess or total stock return. On the right-hand side, the¯rst regressor can be either total return, or excess return, or it can be absent. Next, one can use not only excess return but also total return to sign volume for the purpose of obtaining a proxy for order°ow. Finally, the return sign can be replaced by the return itself, for both excess and total return, motivated by the empirical implementation of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) .
The various speci¯cations described above produce aggregate series that are all substantially di®erent from ours. The correlations between the innovations in the aggregate series produced by our speci¯cation and those for the remaining 23 choices are low, ranging from -0.47 to 0.80 and averaging 0.21. The highest correlation is achieved by the speci¯cation that di®ers from ours only in replacing sign(r Figure 1 . For example, the well-known low-liquidity episodes of October 1987 and September 1998 are much less prominent, and there are a number of downward spikes (e.g. in the late 1990s) in months that are not commonly identi¯ed with low-liquidity events. Moreover, this alternative series does not exhibit the°ight-to-quality e®ects documented for our measure in Table 1 : the stock-bond correlations in low-liquidity months are actually positive. Our liquidity measure therefore seems more appealing than its most highly correlated alternative.
Figure 2 also plots the aggregate series for two other speci¯cations of regression (1) obtained by making only one change to ours. In the upper right panel, the lagged total return r i;d;t is replaced by its excess counterpart r e i;d;t . In the lower left panel, the excess return is replaced by total return throughout, on the left-hand side as well as within the sign operator on the right-hand side. Both alternative series have a correlation of only 0.41 with ours, and the°ight-to-quality e®ects are again absent from both measures. In addition, both series exhibit a negative correlation with the market in negative-return months, in contrast to the signi¯cantly positive correlation obtained for our measure (0.52) as well as for liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and depth considered in other studies. Finally, the¯rst series does not pick up the best-known low-liquidity periods at all, and its time series average is in fact positive, not negative. All of these facts make the alternative speci¯cations less appealing than ours.
Another test of the usefulness of the various alternative speci¯cations of (1) is to what extent they capture the liquidity e®ect modeled in the simulation exercise described in Section II.A. To explore this issue, we repeated the simulation described there for each of the other 23 speci¯cations. The version with the same independent variables as ours but total returns on the left achieves the same correlation (0.98) with the true liquidity value Á i as does our measure. This is not surprising, since the additional noise in the dependent variable under this alternative matters little in the population (large-sample) value for the slope. More inter-esting is that all 22 remaining speci¯cations produce smaller correlations with true liquidity, which lends additional support to our measure as being a sensible speci¯cation relative to seemingly close alternatives.
The last panel of Figure 2 plots the aggregate series obtained by value-weighting our individual stock measures across stocks. This series di®ers substantially from our equalweighted measure, as the correlation between the innovations in the two series is only 0.77. One less attractive feature of the value-weighted series is that certain months when liquidity was notoriously low are relatively unimportant, largely due to the high volatility of the series in the¯rst half of the sample. When all months are sorted by their value-weighted liquidity measures, the October 1987 liquidity crunch appears sixth and September 1998 appears only 25th in the order of importance. Moreover, the value-weighted series fails to exhibit any°i ght-to-quality e®ects: the correlations between stocks and bonds in low-liquidity months are in fact positive. These unappealing features of the value-weighted measure are likely due to its domination by large-cap stocks, whose liquidity often remains high even when smaller-cap stocks experience a liquidity crunch. Our interest centers on a broad liquidity measure, as opposed to a large-stock liquidity measure, so we attempt to measure changes in aggregate liquidity using an equally weighted average of the liquidity measures for individual stocks.
19
One might prefer to replace dollar volume on the right-hand side of regression (1) by turnover, de¯ned as dollar volume divided by market capitalization. Note that, with such a change, the resulting gamma coe±cients are very close to our coe±cients multiplied by the stock's market cap at the beginning of the month, since the e®ects on the independent variable of within-month variation in market cap are likely to be small. Equal-weighting such modi¯ed gamma coe±cients across stocks hence produces the same series as value-weighting our original coe±cients and scaling them by the average market cap of all stocks used to compute the average. The resulting series therefore looks very similar to the series discussed in the previous paragraph, and it inherits all the unappealing features of that series.
To summarize, the various series produced by alternative speci¯cations and weightings of our regression-based liquidity measure are signi¯cantly di®erent from our measure and exhibit various features that render them less appealing as measures of aggregate liquidity.
III. Is Liquidity Risk Priced?
This section investigates whether a stock's expected return is related to the sensitivity of its return to the innovation in aggregate liquidity, L t . That sensitivity, denoted for stock i by its liquidity beta¯L i , is the slope coe±cient on L t in a multiple regression in which the other independent variables are additional factors considered important for asset pricing. To investigate whether the stock's expected return is related to¯L i , we follow a straightforward portfolio-based approach to create a universe of assets whose liquidity betas are su±ciently disperse. At the end of each year, starting with 1965, we sort stocks based on their predicted values of¯L i and form ten portfolios. The post-formation returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years to form a single return series for each decile portfolio. The excess returns on those portfolios are then regressed on return-based factors that are commonly used in empirical asset pricing studies. To the extent that the regression intercepts, or alphas, di®er from zero,¯L i explains a component of expected returns not captured by exposures to the other factors.
For the purpose of portfolio formation, we de¯ne¯L i as the coe±cient on L t in a regression that also includes the three factors of Fama and French (1993) ,
where r i;t denotes asset i's excess return, MKT denotes the excess return on a broad market index, and the other two factors, SMB and HML, are payo®s on long-short spreads constructed by sorting stocks according to market capitalization and book-to-market ratio. This de¯nition of¯L i captures the asset's comovement with aggregate liquidity that is distinct from its comovement with other commonly used factors. We allow¯L i for any given stock to vary through time, and the predicted values of¯L i used to sort stocks are obtained using two methods. The¯rst allows the predicted¯L i to depend on the stock's historical least-squares estimate as well as a number of additional stock characteristics observable at the time of the sort. The results using that method, reported in subsection A, reveal large di®erences in expected returns on¯L i -sorted portfolios that are unexplained by the other factors. The second method uses only historical betas and is presented to con¯rm that thē rst set of results is not driven solely by sorting stocks on the other characteristics that help predict liquidity betas. The results from that method, reported in subsection B, also reveal large and signi¯cant di®erences in alphas on the¯L i -sorted portfolios. Subsection C reports results obtained for portfolios formed by sorting stocks on market capitalization.
Our analysis covers all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ that are ordinary common shares (CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11). Stocks with prices below $5 or above $1,000 are also excluded from the portfolio sorts. The portfolio-formation procedure uses data available only as of the formation date, and this requirement applies to the liquidity series as well. Thus, the formation procedure each year begins with a re-estimation of (7) using only the raw liquidity series (°t) available up to that point in time. The historical values of L t used in that formation year are then recomputed using (8), whereû t is the¯tted residual from that re-estimated regression.
A. Sorting by Predicted Liquidity Betas
A.1. Predicting Liquidity Betas
We model each stock's liquidity beta as a linear function of observable variables,
The vector Z i;t¡1 contains seven characteristics: (i) the historical liquidity beta estimated using all data available from months t ¡ 60 through t ¡ 1 (if at least 36 months are available), (ii) the average value of°i ;t from month t ¡ 6 through t ¡ 1, (iii) the natural log of the stock's average dollar volume from months t ¡ 6 through t ¡ 1, (iv) the cumulative return on the stock from month t ¡ 6 through t ¡ 1, (v) the standard deviation of the stock's monthly return from month t ¡ 6 through t ¡ 1, (vi) the natural log of the price per share from month t ¡ 1, and (vii) the natural log of the number of shares outstanding from month t ¡ 1. (These seven characteristics are listed in Table 2 .) The list of characteristics is necessarily arbitrary, although they do possess some appeal ex ante. Historical liquidity beta should be useful if the true beta is fairly stable over time. The average of the stock's°i ;t and volume can matter if liquidity risk is related to liquidity per se. Stocks with di®erent market capitalization could have di®erent liquidity betas, so we include shares outstanding and stock price, whose product is equal to the stock's market capitalization. The level and variability of recent returns simply allow some role for short-run return dynamics. Each characteristic is \de-meaned" by subtracting the time-series average (through month t ¡ 1) of the characteristic's cross-sectional average in each previous month.
Substituting the right-hand side of (10) for¯L i in (9), we obtain
The above regression for stock i contains 11 independent variables, 7 of which are crossproducts of the elements of Z i;t¡1 with L t . (This approach to incorporating time-variation in betas follows Shanken, 1990.) To increase precision in the face of the substantial variance in individual-stock returns, we restrict the coe±cients Ã 1;i and Ã 2;i in equation (10) 
where the^'s are estimated from the regression of the stock's excess returns on the FamaFrench factors and L t , using all data available up to the current year-end. Then we run a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression of e i;t on the characteristics,
again using all data available up to the current year-end. The¯rst year-end considered here is that of 1965, since the data on L t begin in August 1962, and it seems reasonable to use at least three years of data to conduct the estimation. A stock is excluded for any month in which it has any missing characteristics. Table 2 reports the estimated coe±cientsÃ 1 andÃ 2 from the pooled regression, together with their t-statistics.
20 Results are reported for several periods, each beginning in August 1962 but ending in December of a di®erent year; the estimated coe±cients are those used in the ranking at that year-end. Each coe±cient is multiplied by the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of the corresponding de-meaned characteristic. This scaling helps clarify the relative contributions of the individual characteristics to the predicted betas. Historical liquidity beta is the most important determinant of the predicted beta in the longest sample period, used for the most recent ranking in December 1998. The coe±cient of 2.30 (t = 9:97) indicates that if a stock's historical liquidity beta is one crosssectional standard deviation above the cross-sectional mean of the historical betas, then the stock's predicted liquidity beta is higher by 2.30, holding constant the other characteristics and averaging the e®ect over time. Historical beta is also the most robust determinant of the predicted beta across the di®erent periods. The coe±cient on stock price is signi¯cantly positive early in the sample, but its e®ect weakens in the longer period. Volatility enters negatively, again more strongly in the earlier periods. The coe±cients on the stock's past return, shares outstanding, and average volume are less stable over time. 21 The coe±cient 20 The t-statistics are computed assuming independence of the regression residuals, which are purged of common variation in returns attributable to the three Fama-French factors together with L t .
21 As mentioned earlier, the trading volume of the NASDAQ stocks is overstated relative to the NYSE/AMEX volume. When the NASDAQ stocks are excluded from the pooled regression, the coe±-cient on volume remains negative in the¯rst two subperiods and turns insigni¯cantly negative in the overall on the stock's recent average°i t is signi¯cantly negative in the longest period (and insigni¯-cantly negative in the subperiods), suggesting that stocks with lower liquidity (as measured by°i t ) tend to be more exposed to aggregate liquidity°uctuations.
A.2. Post-Ranking Portfolio Betas
At the end of each year, stocks are sorted by their predicted liquidity betas and assigned to ten portfolios. The predicted beta for each stock is calculated from equation (10), using the year-end values of the stock's characteristics along with the values ofÃ 1 andÃ 2 estimated using data through the current year-end. Portfolio returns are computed over the following 12 months, after which the estimation/formation procedure is repeated. The post-ranking returns are linked across years, generating a single return series for each decile covering the period from January 1966 through December 1999. On average, there are 187 stocks in each portfolio, and no portfolio ever contains fewer than 103 stocks.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the post-ranking liquidity betas of the decile portfolios when the stocks within each portfolio are value weighted. (The results for equally weighted portfolios, not shown, are nearly identical.) The liquidity betas are estimated by running the regression in (9) over the whole sample period, January 1966 through December 1999, as well as over two subperiods. The post-ranking liquidity betas increase across deciles, consistent with the objective of the sorting procedure. The \10-1" spread, which goes long decile 10 (stocks with high liquidity betas) and short decile 1 (stocks with low liquidity betas), has an overall-period liquidity beta of 8.23, with a t-statistic of 2.37. Table 3 reports some additional properties of portfolios sorted by predicted liquidity betas. The low-beta portfolios contain stocks of somewhat smaller¯rms: the valueweighted average size in portfolio 1 is $2.83 billion, as compared to $14.28 billion in portfolio ten (averaged over time). Stocks in the low-beta portfolios also tend to be less liquid, as measured by the average value of°i t , although this pattern is not monotonic. Panel B also reports the decile portfolios' betas with respect to the Fama-French factors, MKT, SMB, and HML, and the previously described momentum factor, MOM. The Fama-French and momentum betas are estimated by regressing the decile excess returns on the returns of period. In addition, the results presented in this section lead to similar conclusions about the relation between liquidity risk and expected stock returns. We retain the NASDAQ stocks in the analysis, because their inclusion increases the dispersion of the post-ranking liquidity betas of the portfolios sorted on predicted betas, in line with the purpose of the sorting procedure. Stocks with prices outside the $5-1000 range are also included in the pooled regression for the same reason: their inclusion increases the spread in the post-ranking betas, even if these stocks are subsequently excluded from the portfolio sorts. the four factor portfolios. All three Fama-French betas of the 10-1 spread are signi¯cantly negative: -0.30 for MKT, -0.65 for SMB, and -0.40 for HML. The SMB betas con¯rm the pattern in average capitalizations, and the HML betas indicate that the 10-1 spread has a tilt toward growth stocks. The 10-1 spread's momentum beta is signi¯cantly positive (0.11), suggesting some tilt toward past winners.
Panel B of
A.3. Alphas
If our liquidity risk factor is priced, we should see systematic di®erences in the average returns of our beta-sorted portfolios. The evidence in Table 4 indeed favors the pricing of liquidity risk. The table reports the value-weighted portfolios' post-ranking alphas estimated under three di®erent factor speci¯cations. The CAPM alpha is computed with respect to MKT, the Fama-French alpha with respect to the Fama-French factors, and the 4-factor alpha with respect to the Fama-French factors and MOM. All three alphas of the 10-1 spread are signi¯cantly positive: the CAPM alpha is 6.40% per year (t = 2:54), the Fama-French alpha is 9.23% per year (t = 4:29), and the 4-factor alpha is 7.48% per year (t = 3:42). (Annual alphas are computed as 12 times the monthly estimates.) The alphas are also robust across the subperiods. For example, the subperiod Fama-French alphas of the 10-1 spread are 8.50% (t = 2:77) and 10.74% (t = 3:53), and the subperiod 4-factor alphas are 6.21% (t = 1:95) and 9.49% (t = 3:12). Table 5 reports alphas when the decile portfolios are equally weighted rather than value weighted. These results are even slightly stronger. For example, the fullperiod CAPM, Fama-French, and 4-factor alphas of the equally weighted 10-1 spread are 8.23%, 10.49%, and 7.66%, respectively. The subperiod results are comparably strong, too.
We also test the hypothesis that all ten alphas are jointly equal to zero, using the test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) . For both equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios and for all three models, the hypothesis is rejected at a 1% signi¯cance level in the overall period. The hypothesis is also rejected at the 5% level in both subperiods, for both equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios and for all three models. The only exception occurs with the four-factor alphas for the value-weighted portfolios in the second subperiod, in which case the hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level.
Overall, the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that our liquidity risk factor is priced. The premium for this risk is positive, in that stocks with higher sensitivity to aggregate liquidity shocks o®er higher expected returns. The latter result is consistent with the notion that a pervasive drop in liquidity is seen as undesirable by the representative investor, so that investor requires compensation for holding stocks with greater exposure to this risk.
A.4. Estimating the Premium Using All Ten Portfolios
The discussion above relies on the 10-1 spread to infer that the expected-return premium associated with liquidity risk is positive. We also estimate the liquidity risk premium using all ten decile portfolios. De¯ne the multivariate regression,
where r t is a 10 £ 1 vector containing the excess returns on the decile portfolios, and F t is a 4£1 vector containing the realizations of the \traded" factors MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM, B is a 10 £ 4 matrix, and¯0 and¯L are 10 £ 1 vectors. We also consider a speci¯cation with only three traded factors, excluding MOM. Assume the decile portfolios are priced by the returns' sensitivities to the traded factors and the non-traded liquidity factor:
where E(¢) denotes the unconditional expectation. Taking expectations of both sides of equation (14) and substituting from equation (15) gives
since the vector of premia on the traded factors,¸F, is equal to E(F t ). The liquidity factor L t is not the payo® on a traded position, so in general the liquidity risk premium¸L is not equal to E(L t ). We estimate¸L using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) . Let µ denote the set of unknown parameters:¸L,¯L, B, and E(L t ). The GMM estimator of µ minimizes g(µ) 0 W g(µ), where g(µ) = (1=T )
and W is a consistent estimator of the optimal weighting matrix.
22
Estimates of the liquidity risk premium¸L are reported in Table 6 , along with asymptotic t-statistics. Results are reported for both value-weighted and equally weighted portfolios.
22 Following Hansen (1982) , we estimate W as the inverse of (1=T ) P T t=1f tf 0 t , wheref t is equal to f t (µ) evaluated at a consistent estimator of µ, obtained by minimizing g(µ) 0 g(µ).
The full-period estimate of¸L is signi¯cantly positive for both sets of portfolios under both speci¯cations (three traded factors or four). The subperiod estimates are all positive, and the majority are statistically signi¯cant. Overall, estimating the liquidity risk premium using all ten portfolios con¯rms the previous inferences based on the extreme deciles.
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Again, liquidity risk appears to be an economically important determinant of expected stock returns.
The magnitude of the liquidity risk premium¸L depends on the arbitrary scaling of L t described earlier, but that scaling does not a®ect the t-statistic or the product¯L i¸L , the contribution of liquidity risk to asset i's expected return. Table 6 also reports the GMM estimates of (¯L 10 ¡¯L 1 )¸L, the di®erence between expected returns on the extreme decile portfolios implied by their liquidity betas. In the overall period, the annualized estimate of (¯L 10 ¡¯L 1 )¸L is 9.63% with three traded factors and 7.56% with four (the corresponding values for equally weighted portfolios are 11.06% and 8.56%). These values are close to the 10-1 spread alphas in Table 4 of 9.23% and 7.48% (the corresponding values in Table 5 for equally weighted portfolios are 10.49% and 7.66%). Thus, even when the liquidity premium is estimated using all ten portfolios, the contribution of liquidity risk to the 10-1 expectedreturn di®erence remains virtually unchanged. The contributions of the traded factors to the expected return of the 10-1 spread are much smaller, all below 2% per year in absolute value for the overall period.
B. Sorting by Historical Liquidity Betas
As discussed earlier, a stock's historical liquidity beta is the most important predictor of its future liquidity beta (Table 2) . If liquidity betas are su±ciently stable over time, sorting on the historical liquidity betas alone could produce dispersion in the post-ranking betas. This section shows that this is indeed the case, although the dispersion in the betas is not as large as when liquidity betas are predicted using additional variables. Although our study focuses primarily on the results produced by sorts on betas predicted with the larger set of variables, we present here some results based on historical-beta sorts in order to show that the results do not hinge on the inclusion of the additional variables.
At the end of each year between 1967 and 1998, we identify stocks with at least¯ve years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end. For each stock, we estimate its historical liquidity beta by running the regression in (9) using the most recent¯ve years 23 In no case does the asymptotic chi-square test reject the restriction in (15) at standard signi¯cance levels. of monthly data. We impose a¯ve-year minimum here in estimating the historical beta, as compared to the minimum of three years required to compute historical betas in the previous analysis. With no other information about liquidity beta brought to bear, it seems reasonable to require a somewhat more precise historical estimate. The series of innovations (L t 's) is again recomputed at the end of each year. Stocks are then sorted by these historical betas into ten value-weighted portfolios. Analogous to our sort on the predicted betas, we obtain a January 1968 through December 1999 series of monthly returns on each decile portfolio by linking across years the post-ranking returns during the next 12 months. On average, there are 217 stocks in each decile portfolio, and no portfolio ever contains fewer than 108 stocks. Table 7 reports, in the same format as Table 3 , the post-ranking liquidity betas as well as the average market capitalization, liquidity, and Fama-French and momentum betas of the decile portfolios. Note that, although the pattern in the post-ranking liquidity betas is not monotonic, sorting on historical betas achieves some success in spreading the post-ranking betas. The liquidity beta of the 10-1 spread is positive at 5.99 (t = 1:88), not as large as the corresponding value of 8.23 (t = 2:37) obtained by sorting on the predicted betas. The SMB beta of the 10-1 spread is signi¯cantly negative, as in Table 3 , but the low-beta portfolio no longer has the lowest market capitalization. Rather, smaller¯rms now occupy both extremes of the historical-beta sort. The latter result is consistent with smaller (and more volatile) stocks producing noisier historical liquidity betas. Also, average liquidity is now lower at both extremes, unlike the pattern in Table 3 . Finally, the tilt toward growth stocks and past winners observed in Table 3 disappears when sorting on historical liquidity betas. Table 8 reports the value-weighted decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas. The dispersion in the alphas is now smaller compared to the previous results, which is consistent with the smaller dispersion in the post-ranking liquidity betas. Nevertheless, all three alphas of the 10-1 spread are still signi¯cantly positive in the overall period: the CAPM alpha is 4.66% per year (t = 2:36), the Fama-French alpha is 4.15% per year (t = 2:08), and the 4-factor alpha is 4.87% per year (t = 2:38).
24 Moreover, the liquidity risk premium estimated from the universe of all ten portfolios, obtained by the same GMM procedure used to produce the values in Table 6 , is positive and signi¯cant at the 10% level. With three traded factors the estimated premium is 0.80 with a t-statistic of 1.77, and with four traded factors it is 1.04 with a t-statistic of 1.76. Note that the magnitude of the premium in either case is fairly close to its counterpart in Table 6 . In summary, the analysis based solely on historical betas supports the conclusion that stocks with greater sensitivity to innovations in aggregate liquidity o®er higher expected returns.
C. Sorting By Size
Total market capitalization, or \size," is a common criterion for sorting stocks in empirical investment studies, and size sorts often produce dispersion in a number of other characteristics. Table 9 reports various properties of decile portfolios formed by sorting on size at the end of each year, where the breakpoints are based on all eligible NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Not surprisingly, smaller stocks are less liquid, in that the average value of°i t increases nearly monotonically across deciles. The liquidity betas of the two or three portfolios containing the smallest stocks are large and signi¯cantly positive, while the betas for the other deciles exhibit no discernible pattern and are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. When the size sort is instead based on breakpoints for NYSE stocks only, so that each decile contains the same number of NYSE stocks but more AMEX and NASDAQ stocks are assigned to the lower deciles, then the pattern in liquidity betas is fairly°at across all ten deciles, except for the large liquidity beta for the¯rst decile. In other words, in a sort on size, the very smallest¯rms tend to be those with high liquidity betas.
It seems plausible that small and illiquid stocks might be those whose values are most impacted by drops in market-wide liquidity, particularly if those drops prompt some investors concerned with the overall liquidity of their portfolios to \°ee" such stocks and move to assets with greater liquidity. At the same time, though, size and liquidity are not the sole determinants of liquidity betas. Recall from Table 3 that, when sorting by predicted liquidity betas, the high-beta portfolios actually have somewhat higher liquidity and average market capitalizations than the low-beta portfolios. It is easy to see why stocks with high liquidity betas need not be illiquid. When market liquidity declines, many investors sell stocks and buy bonds (see Table 1 for indirect evidence), and those investors might prefer to sell liquid stocks in order to save on transaction costs. As a result, the price reaction to aggregate liquidity changes could actually be stronger for stocks that are more liquid. Also, prices of liquid stocks could have greater sensitivity to aggregate liquidity shocks if such stocks are held in larger proportion by the more liquidity-conscious investors. In general, liquidity betas need not bear a simple relation to size and liquidity. Table 9 also reports the size-sorted portfolios' alphas computed with respect to the four factors used previously (the excess market return and size, value, and momentum spreads). Note that, for both the value-and equal-weighted portfolios, the estimated alpha for the decile of smallest¯rms is over 3% annually, with a t-statistic of 2.3. This 3% positive abnormal return can be compared to the portion of expected return attributable to liquidity risk, computed as the product of the portfolio's liquidity beta and the estimate of the liquidity risk premium¸L reported earlier. If we take the premium estimated using the value-weighted beta-sorted portfolios, reported in Panel A in Table 6 (and the lower of the overall-period estimates), that product is 3.7% (= 4:73 £ 0:78) for the equally weighted lowest size decile and 4.1% (= 5:26 £ 0:78) for the value-weighted version. In other words, the liquidity risk of the small-¯rm portfolio appears to be more than su±cient to explain its abnormal return with respect to the other four factors.
D. Individual stock liquidity
This paper investigates whether the cross-section of returns is related to stocks' liquidity betas. A natural separate question is whether stocks whose liquidity is high according to our measure earn high average returns, in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . This question cannot be conclusively answered here. While our estimated liquidity measure seems appealing at the aggregate level, it is too noisy to be useful at the individual stock level. In particular, when stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based on their°i t coe±cients averaged over the past one or three years, the pattern in the post-ranking portfolio°'s is rather°a t across the deciles. The sorting procedure fails due to the large sampling error in the individual stock°i t 's. For this reason, we do not work with individual stock liquidity. It seems our most successful sort on liquidity is the simple size sort described in the previous subsection.
Our result that stocks with high liquidity betas tend to have high average returns does not appear to be explained by liquidity e®ects µ a la Amihud and Mendelson. Although the least liquid stocks in Table 9 tend to have the highest liquidity betas, recall that when stocks are sorted on their predicted liquidity betas, as in Table 3 , stocks with the highest liquidity betas actually have somewhat higher average post-ranking liquidity measures than stocks with the smallest betas. The pricing results in Tables 4 and 5 therefore seem distinct from any pure liquidity e®ects.
Given the mounting evidence on commonality in liquidity, it seems natural to ask whether the sensitivity of stock liquidity to market liquidity is related to the cross-section of returns. This question is di®erent from the one addressed in this paper, since stocks whose liquidities are the most sensitive to market liquidity are not necessarily those whose prices are the most sensitive to market liquidity, but the issue is of independent interest nonetheless. One might conjecture, for example, that stocks whose liquidity dries up the most during market-wide liquidity crises need to compensate investors by higher average returns (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen, 2002) . Our lack of reliable time series of liquidity for individual stocks prevents us from investigating this hypothesis, since sorts on betas (or correlations) of individual liquidity with respect to aggregate liquidity are unable to achieve any signi¯cant post-ranking spread in those quantities. This intriguing topic presents an obvious direction for future research.
IV. An Investment Perspective
The evidence presented in the previous section reveals that liquidity risk is related to expected-return di®erences that are not explained by stocks' sensitivities to MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM. An equivalent characterization of this evidence is that no combination of the latter four factors (and riskless cash) is mean-variance e±cient with respect to the universe of common stocks.
25 In particular, the large and signi¯cant alphas for the 10-1 spreads reported in Tables 4 and 5 imply that adding such positions to an opportunity set consisting of the other four factors increases the maximum Sharpe ratio.
In a linear pricing model in which expected returns are explained by betas with respect to non-traded factors, expected returns are also explained by betas with respect to portfolios whose returns are maximally correlated with those factors.
26 Constructing a maximumcorrelation portfolio for L t from the universe of common stocks is a challenging problem that lies beyond the scope of this study. It is the case that, if the ex post maximum correlation portfolio is constructed from the six-asset universe consisting of the¯rst and last decile portfolios of the liquidity-beta sort as well as the four factors MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM, then the weight on the high-liquidity-beta portfolio is positive and the weight on the low-liquidity-beta portfolio is negative (for both the value-weighted and equally weighted versions of those portfolios). In this sense, adding the 10-1 spread to an investment universe consisting of the original four factors is motivated by a model in which expected returns are related to liquidity risk.
Let LIQ V denote the payo® on the 10-1 spread constructed using value-weighted decile portfolios sorted on predicted liquidity betas, and let LIQ E denote the payo® on the equally 25 The equivalence between multi-beta asset pricing and mean-variance e±ciency of some combination of benchmark portfolios is well known. For an early recognition of this point see Merton (1973) , and for later discussions see Korkie (1982, 1985) , Grinblatt and Titman (1987) , and Huberman, Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987) . 26 Huberman, Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987) characterize the \mimicking" portfolios that can be used in place of non-traded factors when betas with respect to the latter explain expected returns. weighted version. To provide an additional perspective on the importance of liquidity risk, we examine here the degree to which the mean-variance opportunity set is enhanced by adding LIQ V or LIQ E to MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM. Of course, a mean-variancee±cient portfolio is not necessarily the optimal choice of an investor in a world that gives rise to multi-beta pricing, but we believe a mean-variance setting is of interest to many investors nevertheless. Panel A of Table 10 reports, for the overall 1966{1999 period, the maximum ex post Sharpe ratio and the weights in the corresponding tangency portfolio for various subsets of the six factors. For ease of discussion, let S ¤ denote the maximum Sharpe ratio for a given set of assets. The original four factors have an S ¤ of 0.33 (on a monthly basis). When LIQ V is added, S ¤ increases to 0.37, and LIQ V receives a greater weight in the ex post tangency portfolio than MOM (15.6% versus 11.9%). When LIQ E is added to the original four, S ¤ increases to 0.42, and the weight in MOM drops by more than two-thirds, from 20.9% to 6.5%. In contrast, the weight on LIQ E in that case is 25.6%, which is higher than the weights on all but HML (29.6%). Moreover, we see that when adding a fourth factor to the three Fama-French factors, which by themselves have an S ¤ of 0.22, LIQ E is more valuable than MOM by the mean-variance comparison: LIQ E raises S ¤ to 0.40 while MOM raises it to 0.33.
Since LIQ V and LIQ
E¯g ure prominently in the ex-post tangency portfolio, at the expense of MOM especially, we are led to investigate a bit further the extent to which the momentum factor's importance is reduced by our liquidity-risk spreads. Panel B of Table 10 reports the alpha for MOM when regressed on the three Fama-French factors plus either LIQ V or LIQ E .
In the overall period, momentum's annualized alpha with respect to just the three FamaFrench factors is 16.3% with a t-statistic of 4.85, con¯rming a well-known result. Adding LIQ V reduces MOM's alpha somewhat, to 13.9% with a t-statistic of 4.09. The momentum factor MOM is a spread between equally weighted portfolios, and perhaps for that reason the e®ect on its alpha of adding LIQ E to the Fama-French factors is more dramatic. That equally weighted liquidity-risk spread cuts momentum's full-period alpha nearly in half, to 8.4% with a t-statistic of 2.55. In the more recent 17-year subperiod from 1983 through 1999, MOM's estimated alpha in the presence of LIQ E is actually negative, at -1.29.
Although such evidence is tantalizing, it is di±cult to conclude that liquidity risk provides a partial explanation for momentum. On one hand, MOM's alpha is substantially reduced by the addition of liquidity-risk spreads, and MOM's loadings on those spreads are highly signi¯cant in the overall period as well as in both subperiods (in the full period, MOM's beta on LIQ V is 0.26 with t = 3:41, and MOM's beta on LIQ E is 0.75 with t = 7:77, in a multiple regression that includes the three Fama-French factors). On the other hand, the liquidity beta of MOM, estimated as the multiple-regression coe±cient on the non-traded factor L t , is positive but not statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels in the overall period (6.9 with a t-statistic of 1.3). Moreover, in the later subperiod, when LIQ E eliminates MOM's alpha, the estimated liquidity beta of MOM is negative (-1.65 with a t-statistic of -0.23). At the same time, though, we must remember that L t is at best an imperfect proxy for whatever correct measure of liquidity could be relevant for asset pricing. It remains possible that the 10-1 spread constructed by ranking on betas with respect to L t comes closer to the correct mimicking portfolio than does L t to the correct liquidity measure. At this point, however, we can simply observe that momentum's importance in an investment context is impacted signi¯cantly by the addition of spreads based on liquidity risk.
V. Conclusions
Market-wide liquidity appears to be a state variable that is important for pricing common stocks. We¯nd that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of stock returns to innovations in aggregate liquidity. Stocks that are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity have substantially higher expected returns, even after accounting for exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors.
Our liquidity measure captures a dimension of liquidity associated with the strength of volume-related return reversals. Over the last four decades, this measure of market-wide liquidity exhibits a number of sharp declines, many of which coincide with market downturns and apparent°ights to quality. Our liquidity measure is also characterized by signi¯cant commonality across stocks, supporting the notion of aggregate liquidity as a priced state variable. Smaller stocks are less liquid, according to our measure, and the smallest stocks have high sensitivities to aggregate liquidity.
One direction for future research is to explore whether liquidity risk plays a role in various pricing anomalies in¯nancial markets. This study takes a step on this path by showing that the momentum strategy of buying recent winning stocks and selling recent losing stocks becomes less attractive from an investment perspective when portfolio spreads based on liquidity risk are also available for investment. Future research could investigate whether expected returns are related to stocks' sensitivities to°uctuations in other aspects of aggregate liquidity. It would also be useful to explore whether some form of systematic liquidity risk is priced in other¯nancial markets, such as¯xed income markets or international equity markets. , where m t is the total dollar value at the end of month t ¡ 1 of the stocks included in the average in month t, and month 1 corresponds to August 1962. An individual stock's measure for a given month is a regression slope coe±cient estimated using daily returns and volume data within that month. Tick marks correspond to July of the given year. 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 i;d+1;t is replaced by r i;d+1;t on the left-hand side and sign(r e i;d;t ) is replaced by sign(r i;d;t ) on the right-hand side. These three panels plot equal-weighted averages of the slope coe±cients on order°ow in regression (1), multiplied by (m t =m 1 ), where m t is the total dollar value at the end of month t ¡ 1 of the stocks included in the average in month t, and month 1 corresponds to August 1962. The bottom right panel plots the value-weighted average of the individual stock measures from the unaltered version of regression (1). Tick marks correspond to July of the given year. The table reports the correlation between the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted NYSE-AMEX index, R S;t , and (i) minus the change in the rate on one-month Treasury bills, ¡¢R f;t , (ii) the return on long-term government bonds, R GB;t , (iii) the return on long-term corporate bonds, R CB;t , and (iv) the equally weighted average percentage change in monthly dollar volume for NYSE-AMEX stocks, Vol t . \Low-liquidity" months are those in which the innovation in the liquidity series is at least two standard deviations below zero. The p-values for the hypothesis that the correlations during these months are equal to those in other months are computed by a bootstrap approach.
Correlation of R S;t with Number of -¢R f;t R GB;t R CB;t Table 2 Determinants of Predicted Liquidity Betas
Each column reports the results of estimating a linear relation between a stock's liquidity beta and the seven characteristics listed (in addition to the intercept, shown¯rst). At each year-end shown, the estimation uses all stocks de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the given year-end. The estimation uses a two-stage pooled time-series and cross-sectional approach. Each value reported is equal to the coe±cient estimate multiplied by the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional standard deviations of the characteristic. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Aug 1962 Table 3 Properties of Portfolios Sorted on Predicted Liquidity Betas
At each year-end between 1965 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to predicted liquidity betas. The betas are constructed as linear functions of seven stock characteristics at the current year-end, using coe±cients estimated from a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression approach. The estimation and sorting procedure at each year-end uses only data available at that time. Eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The portfolio returns for the 12 post-ranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. Panel A reports the decile portfolios' post-ranking liquidity betas, estimated by regressing the value-weighted portfolio excess returns on the aggregate liquidity innovation and the Fama-French factors. Panel B reports the time-series averages of the deciles portfolios' market capitalization and liquidity, obtained as value-weighted averages of the corresponding measures across the stocks within each decile. Market capitalization is reported in billions of dollars. A stock's liquidity in any given month is the slope coe±cient°i ;t from equation (1), multiplied by 100. Also reported are post-ranking betas with respect to the three Fama-French factors and a momentum factor, estimated by regressing value-weighted portfolio excess returns on the four factors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Table 4 Alphas of Value-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Predicted Liquidity Betas
At each year-end between 1965 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to predicted liquidity betas. The betas are constructed as linear functions of seven stock characteristics at the current year-end, using coe±cients estimated from a pooled timeseries cross-sectional regression approach. The estimation and sorting procedure at each year-end uses only data available at that time. Eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The portfolio returns for the 12 postranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. The table reports the decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas, in percent per year. The alphas are estimated as intercepts from the regressions of excess portfolio post-ranking returns on excess market returns (CAPM alpha), on the Fama-French factor returns (Fama-French alpha) , and on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns (4-factor alphas). The t-statistics are in parentheses. Table 5 Alphas of Equally-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Predicted Liquidity Betas
At each year-end between 1965 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to predicted liquidity betas. The betas are constructed as linear functions of seven stock characteristics at the current year-end, using coe±cients estimated from a pooled timeseries cross-sectional regression approach. The estimation and sorting procedure at each year-end uses only data available at that time. Eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The portfolio returns for the 12 postranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. The table reports the decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas, in percent per year. The alphas are estimated as intercepts from the regressions of excess portfolio post-ranking returns on excess market returns (CAPM alpha), on the Fama-French factor returns (Fama-French alpha) , and on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns (4-factor alphas). The t-statistics are in parentheses. Table 6 Liquidity Risk Premium and its Contribution to Expected Return
The table reports the estimates of the risk premium associated with the liquidity factor, as well as the contribution of liquidity risk to the expected return on the \10-1" spread. Stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios by their predicted liquidity betas at each year-end. The premium¸L is estimated using post-ranking returns on all 10 portfolios. The decile portfolios are value-weighted in Panel A and equally weighted in Panel B. The premium is reported as a monthly value multiplied by 1200, so that the product of the liquidity beta and the reported premium can be interpreted as annual percentage return. The 10-1 spread goes long decile 10, with high liquidity beta¯L 10 , and short decile 1, with low liquidity beta¯L 1 . Table 7 Properties of Portfolios Sorted on Historical Liquidity Betas
At each year-end between 1967 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to historical liquidity betas. The betas are estimated as the slope coe±cients on the aggregate liquidity innovation in regressions of excess stock returns on that innovation and the three Fama-French factors. The regressions are estimated using the most recent¯ve years of data, and eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with¯ve years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The portfolio returns for the 12 post-ranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. Panel A reports the decile portfolios' post-ranking liquidity betas, estimated by regressing value-weighted portfolio excess returns on the liquidity innovation and the Fama-French factors. Panel B reports the time-series averages of each decile's market capitalization and liquidity, obtained as value-weighted averages of the corresponding measures across the stocks within each decile. Market capitalization is reported in billions of dollars. A stock's liquidity in any given month is the slope coe±cient°i ;t from equation (1), multiplied by 100. Also reported are post-ranking betas with respect to the Fama-French and momentum factors, estimated by regressing value-weighted portfolio excess returns on the four factors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. At each year-end between 1967 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to historical liquidity betas. The betas are estimated as the slope coe±cients on the aggregate liquidity innovation in regressions of excess stock returns on that innovation and the three Fama-French factors. The regressions are estimated using the most recent¯ve years of data, and eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with¯ve years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The portfolio returns for the 12 post-ranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. The table reports the decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas, in percent per year. The alphas are estimated as intercepts from the regressions of excess portfolio post-ranking returns on excess market returns (CAPM alpha), on the Fama-French factor returns (Fama-French alpha) , and on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns (4-factor alphas). The t-statistics are in parentheses. Table 9 Portfolios Sorted on Market Capitalization
At each year-end between 1962 and 1998, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to market capitalization. Eligible stocks are de¯ned as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. The breakpoints for the sort are based on all eligible stocks, so that all decile portfolios contain approximately the same number of stocks in each month. The portfolio returns for the 12 post-ranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. Panel A reports the time-series averages of the deciles portfolios' market capitalization and liquidity, obtained as value-weighted averages of the corresponding measures across the stocks within each decile. Market capitalization is reported in millions of dollars. A stock's liquidity in any given month is the slope coe±cient°i ;t from equation (1), multiplied by 100. Panels B and C report the decile portfolios' post-ranking liquidity betas, estimated by regressing excess portfolio returns on the aggregate liquidity innovation and the Fama-French factors. Also reported are the portfolios' alphas, estimated as intercepts from the regressions of excess portfolio post-ranking returns on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns. The t-statistics are in parentheses. All statistics are calculated over the period January 1963 through December 1999. Table 10 Liquidity-Risk Spreads and Investment Opportunities
Each row of Panel A reports the ex-post tangency portfolio weights (in percent) as well as the ex-post monthly Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio in the given asset universe. The assets available for investment are various subsets of six traded factors. This set comprises the Fama-French factors MKT, SMB, and HML, a momentum factor MOM, and two liquidity-risk spreads, both of which go long decile 10, containing the stocks with the highest predicted liquidity betas, and short decile 1, containing the stocks with the lowest betas. Each leg of the spread is value-weighted in LIQ V and equally-weighted in LIQ E . Panel B reports the alphas (in percent per year) of the momentum portfolio with respect to the factors listed in the row label. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
